EAP-IKEv2: Use os_memcmp_const() for hash/password comparisons

This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>

src/eap_common/eap_ikev2_common.c

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ int eap_ikev2_validate_icv(int integ_alg, struct ikev2_keys *keys,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (os_memcmp(icv, end - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
+	if (os_memcmp_const(icv, end - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-IKEV2: Invalid ICV");
 		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-IKEV2: Calculated ICV",
 			    icv, icv_len);

src/eap_common/ikev2_common.c

@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ u8 * ikev2_decrypt_payload(int encr_id, int integ_id,
 			   "hash");
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if (os_memcmp(integ, hash, integ_alg->hash_len) != 0) {
+	if (os_memcmp_const(integ, hash, integ_alg->hash_len) != 0) {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "IKEV2: Incorrect Integrity Checksum "
 			   "Data");
 		return NULL;

src/eap_peer/ikev2.c

@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static int ikev2_process_auth_secret(struct ikev2_responder_data *data,
 		return -1;
 
 	if (auth_len != prf->hash_len ||
-	    os_memcmp(auth, auth_data, auth_len) != 0) {
+	    os_memcmp_const(auth, auth_data, auth_len) != 0) {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "IKEV2: Invalid Authentication Data");
 		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "IKEV2: Received Authentication Data",
 			    auth, auth_len);

src/eap_server/ikev2.c

@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int ikev2_process_auth_secret(struct ikev2_initiator_data *data,
 		return -1;
 
 	if (auth_len != prf->hash_len ||
-	    os_memcmp(auth, auth_data, auth_len) != 0) {
+	    os_memcmp_const(auth, auth_data, auth_len) != 0) {
 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "IKEV2: Invalid Authentication Data");
 		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "IKEV2: Received Authentication Data",
 			    auth, auth_len);